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Bank card; PIN; electronic signature; 
verification of customer; negligence of the 
bank; negligence of the customer; fraud; 
burden of proof; events taking place before the 
Payment Services Regulations 2009 in force
1. The claimant was a customer of the defendant 
bank at its King’s Cross branch. On 14 November 
2008, £20,400 was transferred by telephone from 
the claimant’s Bonus Saver account to his current 
account leaving less than £100 in the Saver account. 
Immediately before the transfer there was some 
£2,300 in the claimant’s current account. Between 14 
and 20 November inclusive a number of transactions 
took place using the claimant’s debit card for his 
current account to make withdrawals from cash 
machines or purchases, the largest of which was the 
purchase of a Rolex watch for £14,420 from Watches 
of Switzerland. The transactions totalled £23,915.76. 
Claimant denies that he initiated or authorised 
any of these transactions. The defendant bank has 
declined to re-credit to the account. The claimant’s 
claim is therefore for the amount of the withdrawals, 
consequential loss and interest.
2. Since the discovery of the disputed transactions, the 
claimant has been consistent in his version of what 
happened and he has vigorously pursued his claim 
against the bank taking it as far as he could through 
the bank’s internal procedures, reporting the matter to 
the police, asking his MP for assistance and making a 
complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service.
3. In essence, he said that he received a phone call 
shortly after 3 pm on Thursday 13 November 2008 
while he was working (he is a bus driver). At that 
point, his bus was briefly stopped so he was able 
to answer the call. A man calling himself Stuart said 
that he was calling from Barclays’ fraud department 
and that Mr Rahman’s debit card was being used at 
Argos in Camden. Mr Rahman confirmed that he was 
not using the card and told Stuart to cancel the card 
immediately. Stuart told him this would be done. 
During this phone call, he checked his wallet where 
he always kept his debit card and discovered it was 
missing. He subsequently received more telephone 
calls from the same number which he was unable 
to answer because he was driving. He then received 
a text message containing a reference number and 
asking him to call the same number from which the 
earlier telephone calls had been received (0870 
3832274). When he finished his shift at about 4 pm, 
he telephoned the number, spoke to Stuart again who 
assured him that everything was okay and that card 
had been cancelled.
4. Nothing further happened until the following night 
(Friday 14 November) when he decided to telephone 
the defendant’s dedicated lost and stolen telephone 
number at about 10:30 pm to enquire what was 
happening. After being put on hold and transferred 
several times, he spoke to a person called Matthew. 
He was told about several transactions which had 
taken place on his account that day including the 
transfer from the Bonus Saver account. He told 
Matthew that he had not authorised any of them. He 
said he told Matthew to freeze his account and cancel 
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his debit card which Matthew agreed to do.
5. Mr Rahman says that he tried to go to his branch the 
following day (Saturday 15 November) but it and the 
branches in Camden and Kentish Town were closed 
so it was not until Monday 17 November that he was 
able to go to his branch and discuss the matter. He 
discovered that his card had not in fact been cancelled 
on 14 November. His personal banking manager 
ensured that the card was stopped at 9.55 that day.
6. The defendant bank declined to refund the money 
as they considered that Mr Rahman must have 
been negligent at the very least and disclosed his 
PIN number to someone else. They came to this 
conclusion because their records showed that the 
debit card used was the actual debit card issued to Mr 
Rahman (and not a clone). Also, the PIN was correctly 
entered at the first attempt for all the transactions. In 
addition, the person who used the card at Watches 
of Switzerland had correctly answered some identity 
verification questions. The telephone transfer of 
£20,400 from the bonus Saver account to the current 
account could only have been completed if either 
caller had correctly entered on the telephone keypad 
the sort code, account number, pass code and 
registration key. Alternatively, if the transfer had not 
been done automatically but by speaking to a member 
of Barclays’ staff, the caller would have had to answer 
correctly some identity verification questions.
7. It was not until earlier this year that it occurred to the 
defendant that this case had some of the key features 
of a scam known as Operation O. According to the 
evidence of Mr Holmes, the defendant’s Investigations 
Intelligence Manager, the pattern for this fraud is that 
the bank’s customer receives a call from someone 
purporting to be from the bank’s fraud department 
saying that the customer’s account has been subject 
to fraudulent activity. The customer is told that in 
order to cancel their card or to investigate the bank 
will require the customer’s card, corresponding PIN 
and other personal information. The customer is told 
a courier will be sent to collect their card and the 
relevant information from them. The card is collected 
and delivered to an address in the Grays Inn area. 
The fraudster waits by the address for the courier 
to arrive and takes possession of the card and other 
information.
8. The defendant considers that Mr Rahman may be a 
victim of this fraud because the telephone number 
used to telephone him on 13 November and which he 
used to call back has been associated with Operation 
O cases on 18 occasions. On 28 occasions the caller 
has identified himself as Stuart. Quite often, the card 
is first used at Lloyds TSB ATM at 344 Grays Inn Road 
and this happened in Mr Rahman’s case also.
9. The defendant knew that the firm Addison Lee had 
been used by the fraudsters in some of the cases to 
collect the cards. They made enquiries of Addison Lee 
and have produced a witness statement from Linda 
Ibrahim (who also gave evidence). She did not have 
any personal dealings but checked Addison Lee’s 
computer system which shows that at 9:45 am on 
14 November, a booking was made for a direct bike 
immediate pickup from the claimant’s address at Flat 
21 Sandfield Cromer Street WC1H 8DU and deliver to 
280 Grays Inn Road WC1X 8EB. The caller gave his 
name as Stuart Catterwell and a mobile telephone 
number of 07542 847431. The computer records 
showed that the item was recorded as having been 
delivered at 10:17 am and the fee was paid in cash by 
the recipient.
10. Mr Rahman denied that he had given any personal 
or security information to Stuart over the telephone 
on 13 November. He was adamant that he had not 
been asked to send his card, PIN number or any other 
information by courier to Barclays. He also denied that 
any envelope had been collected from him or from his 
address on 14 November. He confirmed that he was at 
home at around 10 am when the package would have 
been collected.
11. I have come to the conclusion that Mr Rahman is 
not telling the whole truth about the content of his 
telephone conversations with Stuart on 13 November 
or the events of the morning of 14 November.
12. If, as Mr Rahman maintains, his debit card had already 
been obtained by fraudsters before he received the 
telephone call from Stuart, it is difficult to understand 
what possible purpose the fraudsters could have had 
in telephoning him solely to alert him to the fact that 
his card was missing and was being (or about to be) 
misused. It seems to me much more likely that the 
purpose of the telephone calls was to obtain the card 
and information to enable it to be used.
13. Despite Mr Rahman’s denial that any package 
was collected from his home on the morning of 14 
November, I accept the information extracted from 
Addison Lee’s computer system is accurate. There 
is no reason for Ms Ibrahim or anyone at Addison 
case Judgment: england & Wales
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        171© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
Lee to lie about this. Again, it is impossible to see 
what benefit it would be to the fraudsters to make 
this booking and pay the courier if not to collect Mr 
Rahman’s card and other information.
14. Mr Rahman speculated that his debit card had not 
been returned to him when he last used it at his 
branch on 23 September 2008 to transfer money 
from his current account to his Bonus Saver account. 
He confirmed that other items which he had handed 
over (driving licence and passport) were returned. 
However flustered he may have been by the bank 
clerk trying to persuade him to take out a loan which 
he did not need, it seems unlikely that he would not 
have realised soon after he left the bank that he did 
not have his debit card (even though he rarely used 
it). It also seems unlikely that a bank employee or 
anyone else intending to misuse the card would wait 
so long before trying to withdraw any money or that 
they would telephone him to alert him to the fact that 
his card was missing immediately before they started 
to use it. There is no evidence to suggest that this 
fraud has been committed with the help of a Barclay’s 
employee.
15. I find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Rahman’s 
debit card was not missing from his wallet on 13 
November but was given by him to the courier on the 
morning of 14 November. I also find that during his 
telephone calls with Stuart on 13 November and/or 
in the documents or information included with the 
card given to the courier on 14 November, Mr Rahman 
disclosed enough sensitive information to enable the 
fraudsters to use the card and to know he had a Bonus 
Savings account and roughly how much was in it.
16. I find the claimant’s conduct on 13 and 14 November 
2008 which led to the disputed transactions was not 
dishonest or fraudulent because he was tricked into 
handing over his debit card and information needed 
by the fraudsters to use it (although his subsequent 
behaviour in concealing the full truth when dealing 
with the bank, financial ombudsman and the court 
was dishonest). However, I find that he did not use 
reasonable care on 13 and 14 November 2008. He 
had no way of knowing that the call from Stuart was 
genuine or that the telephone number used belonged 
to the defendant. It would have been a simple matter 
for him to telephone the defendant’s dedicated 
lost or stolen card number (which he did late on 14 
November) or contact his local branch before handing 
over his card and other information to the courier.
17. The terms and conditions applying to the account 
require the customer to tell the bank as soon as 
reasonably possible if the card and/or card details 
are lost or stolen or if the customer thinks they have 
been misused or that the PIN number has become 
known to another person or if there is any other risk 
of an unauthorised use of the card (clause 6). Clause 
7 of the terms and conditions absolves the customer 
from liability for any unauthorised transaction after 
the customer has notified the bank of the loss, theft 
or misuse of the card or the PIN becoming known 
to any other person unless the customer has acted 
fraudulently or without reasonable care. The customer 
is also made liable for any transactions before the card 
is reported lost or stolen or misused if the customer 
has acted fraudulently or without reasonable care.
18. I understand the defendant accepts the Banking 
Code (March 2008 edition) also applies to this case. 
Clause 12.11 provides that if the customer acts without 
reasonable care and this causes losses, the customer 
may be responsible for them. Clause 12.12 provides if 
someone else uses the card before notification to the 
bank that it has been lost or stolen or someone else 
knows the PIN the most the customer will have to pay 
is £50 unless the bank can show that the customer 
has acted fraudulently or without reasonable care.
19. Therefore, if the test to be applied is that in the 
defendant’s terms and condition and the Banking 
Code (failure to use reasonable care), the claimant 
would be responsible for losses which occurred before 
the defendant was notified.
20.However, the claimant argues that the correct test 
is that set out in the Payment Services Regulations 
2009 (the Regulations) which came into force on 1 
November 2009. Regulation 60 provides that where 
a service user denies having authorised an executed 
payment transaction or claims that the payment 
transaction has not been correctly executed, it is for 
the payment service provider to prove the payment 
transaction was authenticated, accurately recorded, 
entered into the payment service provider’s accounts 
and not affected by a technical breakdown or some 
other deficiency. Authenticated means the use of any 
procedure by which a payment service provider is able 
to verify the use of a specified payment instrument 
including personalised security features. The use of a 
payment instrument recorded by the payment service 
provider is not in itself necessarily sufficient to prove 
either that the payment transaction was authorised 
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by the payer or that the payer acted fraudulently or 
failed with intent or gross negligence to comply with 
regulation 57.
21. Regulation 57 requires the customer to use the 
payment instrument in accordance with the terms and 
conditions governing its use and to notify the provider 
in the agreed manner and without undue delay on 
becoming aware of the loss, theft, misappropriation or 
unauthorised use of the payment instrument. It also 
provides that the customer must take all reasonable 
steps to keep its personalised security features safe.
22.The first issue with regard to the Regulations is 
whether they apply to this case at all because they 
did not come into force until nearly a year after the 
disputed transactions and after the defendant has 
decided to hold Mr Rahman liable for the losses 
because they were carried out with the claimant’s 
card and PIN. The first written notification of this 
decision is dated 23 December 2008. It was re-
confirmed on 16 March 2009 in the defendant’s Final 
Response (indicating the complaints procedure has 
been exhausted and Mr Rahman could then refer 
to the Financial Ombudsman Service). The claimant 
maintains that the defendant must have made 
decisions about the matter after 1 November 2009 
(by continuing to defend the referral to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service and these proceedings) and that 
any decision made after 1 November 2009 engages 
the Regulations.
23.The Regulations themselves do not contain any 
transitional provisions or specifically state that only 
transactions after 1 November 2009 are governed 
by them. Equally, they do not state that transactions 
before 1 November 2009 are covered if there is a 
decision made after that date.
24.Both counsel agree that the basic legal principle is that 
legislation is not retrospective unless it specifically 
so provides. In the absence of any specific provision 
in the Regulations or authority on the point, I take 
the view that the Regulations cannot apply to these 
transactions because they occurred before the 
Regulations came into force. I am not convinced by 
the claimant’s assertion that a decision made the 
bank after 1 November 2009 is sufficient to activate 
the Regulations. There is no justification for this in 
the Regulations themselves. It would be strange 
for Regulations not to apply for a period but then 
suddenly to be effective because the bank had made 
a decision. In any event, in this case it could be said 
that the defendant has not made a decision but has 
simply been defending the decisions it made before 1 
November 2009. Therefore, I find that the Regulations 
do not apply to this case.
25.The claimant is therefore responsible for losses which 
occurred before the defendant was notified but 
this raises two further issues. The first is when the 
defendant was notified (late on the evening of the 
14 November as the claimant states or early on 17 
November as the defendant’s records show). There 
is also the issue of whether the defendant itself 
breached its terms and conditions or was negligent 
in permitting the telephone transfer £14,200 from 
the bonus Saver account to the current account on 14 
November and then authorising the purchase of the 
Rolex watch from Watches of Switzerland.
26.With respect to the first issue, the defendant maintains 
that it was not notified of the situation until the 
claimant called into his local branch early on 17 
November. The claimant maintains that he notified 
the defendant late on the evening of 14 November by 
telephoning its dedicated telephone number for lost 
and stolen cards.
27.The defendant says that it has no record whatsoever 
of a telephone call from the claimant on 14 November. 
The claimant has produced his itemised telephone 
records showing that a call was made from his 
telephone to the defendant’s dedicated lost and 
stolen cards number on 14 November at 23:41 and 
the call lasted 38:51 minutes. There seems no reason 
not to accept that the claimant’s telephone bill shows 
that the call was in fact made. It lasted a long time. It 
is not suggested by the defendants that callers at that 
time were put on hold for such a long period before 
speaking to a call operator. In the absence of any 
evidence from the defendant as to the content of this 
conversation, I find that the claimant’s evidence with 
regard to this telephone call is probably correct and 
that he did speak to somebody at the lost and stolen 
card department. It is understandable that he would 
phone to find out what is happening. It is difficult to 
believe that he did not make it clear that he did not 
authorise the transactions and that his debit card 
should be cancelled.
28. I find that the defendant should have cancelled the 
claimant’s debit card by 00.20 on 15 November 2008 
and the bank should re-credit to Mr Rahman’s account 
any debits made using his card after that time.
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29. However, by that time £17,385.48 had been taken 
from the current account. The fraudsters were 
only able to obtain so much because £14,200 was 
transferred from the Bonus Saver account to the 
current account on 14 November by telephone. The 
claimant asserts that the defendant should not have 
permitted the transfer.
30. Mr Rahman denies he has ever registered for 
telephone banking although the defendant’s records 
show that he registered on 27 May 2006 (9 days after 
opening his Bonus Saver account). It was suggested 
by the defendant’s Investigations Intelligence 
Manager, Mr Holmes, that it was possible that this as 
been arranged while Mr Rahman was in the branch on 
other matters and he may not have realised that he 
was registered. In any event, it seems to be accepted 
that he had not used telephone banking before 14 
November. On balance, I accept that Mr Rahman was 
registered for telephone banking in 2006. It was not 
set up as part of the scam of November 2008.
31. Unfortunately, the defendant has not been able to 
produce any information as to the precise way in 
which the transfer was effected. Its records show it 
was over the telephone but not whether this was by 
speaking to someone at a call centre or automatically 
by keying in the sort code, account number, passcode 
and registration key. If the latter method was used, 
then I would find on the balance of probabilities 
that the transfer was made possible only because 
the claimant disclosed the necessary information to 
the fraudsters. If the former method was used, the 
claimant would argue that the defendant’s employee 
did not exercise sufficient care in checking the identity 
of the caller particularly as he has no history of dealing 
with such transfers over the telephone, he has always 
gone into the branch.
32. As we do not know whether the fraudsters spoke to 
the defendant’s employee over the telephone, we 
do not know what identity verification questions he 
was asked and whether he answered them correctly. 
Verifying the identity of callers is such a routine 
matter for banks, it seems unlikely that this was not 
done. Bearing in mind that this was a transfer from 
one account in the name of the claimant to another 
account in his name, there is no reason for the bank’s 
employee to be as suspicious as he might be if the 
payment were to a third party.
33. The defendant has been able to produce information 
as to the questions which were asked of the fraudster 
in the Watches of Switzerland shop. The defendant’s 
internal report shows that the fraudster was asked 
first all how long the account had been open. The 
answer was 10 years or something. That answer would 
not be accepted as it is quite vague. (The account was 
in fact opened some 3 years earlier in August 2005). 
The next question was where his account holding 
branch was and this was answered correctly. He was 
also asked whom he shared the account with and the 
again this was answered correctly (i.e. no one). He was 
asked how long he had been at his current address. 
The answer was “all my life” which the report notes 
is quite vague (I do not have any evidence as to the 
correct answer for this question). The fraudster said 
that he was buying a wedding present for his brother. 
As has been pointed out on behalf of the claimant, the 
two answers which were correct (i.e. that the account 
was in his sole name and that the holding branch was 
King’s Cross) may have been gleaned from the debit 
card itself which contains the sort code and gave no 
indication that there was any other person named on 
the account. Equally, the information could have been 
disclosed by Mr Rahman in his telephone calls with 
Stuart or in the information he handed over to the 
courier. It is of relevance that these questions were 
asked in the context of the genuine card being used 
and the PIN being entered correctly first time and was 
for an amount which was covered by an apparently 
authorised recent large transfer from the Bonus Saver 
account.
34. The claimant has also pointed to the fact that the 
pattern of use of his accounts from 14 November 
was different from his usual pattern. Although he 
had transferred large sums from his Bonus Saver 
account before, this had been done by attendance 
at the bank rather than by telephone. There were 
several ATM balance enquiries whereas he rarely 
used ATMs. In fact he rarely used his debit card at all 
but it was used frequently in the period in question, 
generally for comparatively small sums in High Street 
shops. However, customers do change their spending 
patterns on occasion such as when on holiday or for 
a particular reason. They also become irate (and it 
causes them embarrassment and inconvenience) 
if their card is blocked when they try to use it for 
a genuine transaction. Looking at the record of 
transactions on 14 November, I am not satisfied that 
the defendant should have suspected unauthorised 
use on that date.
35. Taking into account the context in which these two 
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transactions (transfer from the Bonus Saver account 
and payment to Watches of Switzerland) were made 
and the fact that we do not know precisely what 
information the claimant disclosed to the fraudster, 
I do not find that the defendant has breached 
contractual obligations or the Banking Code 2008 or 
that it has been negligent. Therefore, the claimant is 
liable for the all losses until 00:20 on 15 November 
2008 but the defendant should reimburse him for 
debits after that time.
36. I hope the parties will be able to agree the calculation 
of the relevant figure and interest. I do not know 
whether there will be any issues regarding costs but 
the parties should endeavour to agree those also.
37. This judgment will be formally handed down at 9.30 
on Monday 12 November 2012.
38. It will not be necessary for the parties to attend if 
they have agreed the wording of the order and send 
it to court in advance. If they cannot agree, it would 
be helpful if the parties would notify each other and 
me by email of the issues they wish to raise by noon 
on Friday 9 November 2012. If the hearing is likely to 
need more than 30 minutes (or will not exceed that 
time but one or both advocates is unable to attend on 
12 November) please let me know as soon as possible 
and I will re-arrange the date.
District Judge Millard 
24 October 2012
Commentary
By Stephen Mason and Nicholas Bohm
It appears from the judgment that Mr Rahman was the 
subject of ‘courier fraud’, given that the judge concluded 
(para 11) that Mr Rahman was not telling the truth (see 
also para 16) – although it was accepted that he had 
telephoned the bank (para 27), and to this extent the bank 
were found to be liable for losses that occurred after the 
telephone call was made.
The digital data
The judge accepted that the data extracted from Addison 
Lee’s computer system was accurate (para 13). The 
reasoning, which must be right, was that there was no 
motive for Ms Ibrahim or anyone at Addison Lee to lie 
about the evidence. The conclusion was aided by the 
difficulty in seeing how the fraudsters would benefit from 
booking and paying the courier unless it was to collect Mr 
Rahman’s card and other information.
A more serious issue relating to electronic evidence was 
the failure of the bank to prove the precise way in which 
the transfer of monies between accounts was effected. 
This was a serious lacuna in the bank’s evidence, and 
demonstrates the difficulties of poor digital systems that 
fail to record events effectively.
Less convincing is the dismissal of the argument that 
the bank ought to have noticed the unusual transactions 
on the account. It is not clear whether Mr Rahman’s 
lawyer effectively examined the evidence, or if cogent 
arguments were put before the judge on this issue.
Verification of identity
The judge made some very helpful comments relating 
to the verification of identity (para 33) that bear careful 
consideration.1 
Payment Services Regulations
The judge concluded that the Payment Services 
Regulations 2009 were not relevant because they were 
not in force at the material time, and there was no 
indication that the Regulations had a retrospective effect. 
This must also be right, although whether the Regulations 
were in force or not does not alter the fact that the burden 
of proof was on the bank to prove that Mr Rahman carried 
out the transactions or that he was negligent.
Burden of proof
The weakest point seems to be the transfer from the 
savings account to the current account by some variety of 
telephone banking. It is arguable that the judge failed to 
direct herself clearly that the burden of proof was on the 
bank to show that the transfer was authorised, and that in 
view of the inability of the bank to give details of how the 
transaction was authorised, the judge ought to have held 
that the bank had failed to discharge the burden of proof. 
In effect the judge relied on an assumption that the bank 
probably did the right thing, and ought not to have done so.
There seems to have been no attempt to introduce 
any technical evidence to show how the debit card 
transactions might have been made without the use of 
the correct PIN. If so, it seems unlikely that the Court of 
Appeal would admit new material on this point, since it 
could have been adduced before the judge.
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